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As Mr. Justice Schauer has made a correct summation of
the evidence in his dissenting opinion in this case I shall
not attempt to do so, but wish to add my unqualified concurrence with his statement that the evidence disclosed by the
record is amply sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury
as to the invalidity of the will.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment denying probate of
the will here involved.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 3,
1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18431. In Bank.

Mar. 14, 1952.]

MARIE MARGARET MASCHIO FREDRICKSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents;
CAREW AND ENGLISH, INC., Real Party in Interest.
[1]

Decedents' Estates-Accounting-Settlement--Conclusiveness.
-Ordinarily an order settling a :final account of an administratrix is conclusive on unpaid creditors.
[2] Id.- Accounting- Settlement- Vacation of Order.- There
must be some legally recognized basis for vacating an order
settling a :final account of an admip.istratrix; if there is none,
the court acts in excess of its power in so acting.
[3] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-AppeaL-No appeal lies from
an order vacating orders settling a :final account of an administratrix, directing :final distribution and discharging an
administratrix, as such order is not listed as an appealable one
in Prob. Code, § 1240.
[ 4] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Certiorari.-Although proper
notice of hearing on settlement of an administratrix' :final
account be given, it cannot be said, on a certiorari proceed-

[1] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 1146; Am.Jur.,
Executors and Administrators, § 539.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 912; [2, 5, 8, 10]
Decedents' Estates, § 910.2; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 918; [4, 9]
Decedents' Estates, § 925; [6] Certiorari, § 20; [7] Certiorari,
§ 74; [11] Certiorari, § 10.
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ing to review an order vacating a decree settling such account, that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to give relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, insofar as the evidence
of excusable neglect, etc., is concerned, because certiorari
can be granted only if it be shown that the probate court
exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside such decree. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1068.)
[5] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of Decree.-Probate
court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vacate a decree settling the final account of an administratrix, ordering
distribution and discharging the administratrix, on the ground
that the account was not verified and did not show all claims
filed or presented against the estate, that movant's claim was
allowed by the court but had not been paid or otherwise acted
upon, and that no notice of rejection was served on claimant;
and to grant or deny the application in the exercise of its
discretionary power. (Pro b. Code, § 1233; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473.)
[6] Certiorari-Excess or Want of Jurisdiction.-Certiorari will
not lie where the only excess of jurisdiction alleged relates
to insufficiency of the evidence.
[7] Id.-Hearing.-On certiorari matters within the discretion of
the lower court are not reviewable.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of Decree.-Order of probate court vacating decree settling an administratrix' final account may be based on Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, although the inadvertence, excusable neglect, etc., were
not set forth as grounds· in the notice of motion to vacate, as
required by Code Civ. Proc., § 1010, it being sufficient that
the notice indicated that relief should be given on those
grounds.
[9] Id.-Accounting--Settlement-Certiorari.-Where affidavit in
opposition to petition to review order vacating decree settling
administratrix' final account states that, at the hearing on
motion to vacate, the administratrix was advised that the
motion was made under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, which is not
denied by her, and where she made no objection to the hearing of the motion on the grounds of mistake, excusable neglect, etc., it cannot be said, in the certiorari proceeding, that
the probate court acted in excess of jurisdiction
[10] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of Decree.-Where
grounds for vacating decree settling an administratrix' final
account are raised at the hearing, and no objection is made
by the administratrix to sufficiency of the notice of motion
in that respect, she waives any such objection.
[6] See Cal.Jur., Certiorari, § 4; Am.Jur., Certiorari, § 5.
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[11] Certiorari-Excess or Want of Jurisdiction.-Assuming that
affidavits must accompany a motion under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, the failure to file them with the notice of motion is
not a jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior Court
of the City and County of San Francisco, vacating judgment
settling final account of administratrix, ordering distribution
and discharging administratrix. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge.
Affirmed.
Sefton & Anderson and Seibert L. Sefton for Petitioner.
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe and Caspar Willard
Weinberger for Respondents and Real Party in Interest.
CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in certiorari to annul
an order of the superior court sitting in probate vacating a
decree settling the final account of the administratrix, ordering distribution and discharging the administratrix in the
estate of Robert E. Maschio, deceased.
Maschio having died intestate, Marie Frederickson, as guardian of the estate of Esther Maschio, a minor daughter of
the deceased, was issued letters of administration. Notice to
creditors was duly given. Carew and English, a corporation,
in due time and form presented to counsel for the administratrix its verified claim in the sum of $1,071, for the funeral
expenses of the deceased. Apparently, the administratrix'
name appears on the claim, but it is agreed that she did not
approve it. The probate judge did approve it. It also appears
that it was filed with the clerk. No notice of rejection of the
claim was given. Counsel for the administratrix testified
at the hearing on the motion later discussed herein that his
office had sent the claim to decedent's sisters and he thought
they had paid it. The claim has not been paid.
In proper time the administratrix filed her final account
and petition for its settlement and distribution of the estate.
It was not verified as required by section 922 of the Probate
Code, nor did it contain a list of claims filed or presented
as required by that section and section 921. In the account
it was stated that all the claims had been paid and testimony
to the same effect was given at the hearing on the account.
On November 29, 1950, the court made its orders settling
the account, distributing the estate and discharging the ad-
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ministratrix. On May 28, 1951, and within six months of
the order of settlement (see Code Civ. Proc., § 473), Carew
and English made a motion to vacate those orders, stating
as grounds in its notice of motion:
'' 1. That the . . . account filed herein . . . was not verified, as required by Section 922 of the Probate Code;
'' 2. That said account does not show all the claims filed
or presented against said estate, as required by said Section
922 of the Probate Code;
'' 3. That CAREW & ENGLISH, INc., . . . duly presented a
claim in the sum of $1,071.00 against the estate of said
decedent within the time prescribed by law, and at the place
designated in the Notice to Creditors; said claim is on file
herein and purports to have been approved by said administratrix, and was allowed by the Court;
'' 4. That said claim was not paid or otherwise acted upon,
and that no notice of rejection of said claim was served on
claimant ;
'' 5. On all the files, pleadings and papers herein;
'' 6. On oral testimony to be adduced at the hearing of the
motion i.
"7. That said Decree of Distribution and said Decree of
Discharge are and each of them is void, for the reasons set
forth in the grounds for this motion above stated.''
At the hearing on the motion counsel for the administratrix
testified as above mentioned. Counsel for Carew and English
asserted that there had been a fraud on the court and stressed
the lack of verification of the account and petition for distribution. The facts above mentioned were made to appear.
The court expressed the view that that was "enough" for it
and agreed there was a fraud on the court and stated: "It
would be a fraud on the Court, and the person would be
guilty of perjury." The court also said: "Well, even the
six months would not bar you here-this is a fraud on the
Court-it can be brought up at any time."
A minute order was made granting the motion and the
administratrix seeks to have it annulled on certiorari, asserting that the court had no power to vacate the settlement
as it is binding and conclusive on Carew and English.
[1] With exceptions not here pertinent an order settling
a final account is conclusive on unpaid creditors. (Federal
Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Sandbe1·g, 35 Cal.2d 1 [215 P.2d 721] ;
Estate of Mailheb~tau, 218 Cal. 202 [22 P.2d 514] ; Estate of
Fernandez, 119 Cal. 579 [51 P. 851].) [2] There must be
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some legally recognized basis for vacating such a final order,
and if there is none, the court acts in excess of its power in
so acting. [3] With reference to the remedy by certiorari,
it is settled that no appeal lies from the order of vacation as it
is not listed as an appealable order in section 1240 of the
Probate Code. (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 159
[222 P.2d 874]; Howard v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.2d 784, 787
[154 P.2d 849] .) Hence, the question of availability of appeal is not presented.
There is considerable discussion in the briefs as to whether
the motion was made or granted under section 473 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a legally recognized method of vacating
a final judgment on the grounds of inadvertence or excusable
neglect, because of the failure of Carew and English to contest the settlement of the account and Carew and English
here base their argument in support of the order of vacation
on that section. It is true that the section was not mentioned
in the notice of motion, but it does point at inadvertence and
excusable neglect inasmuch as it details what happened, that
the claim was filed, was on its face approved by the administratrix and judge but was not paid and no notice of
rejection was given. At the hearing the facts were developed
as heretofore set forth. There may have been more as the
record on the hearing of the motion recites that "argument
and discussion'' followed, but does not state of what it consisted. [4] While proper notice of the hearing on the settlement of the account was given, we cannot say on this certiorari
proceeding that the court lacked jurisdiction to give relief
under section 473 insofar as the evidence of excusable neglect,
etc., is concerned, because such relief (certiorari) "could be
granted only if it be shown that the probate court in denying
[or granting] the motion to set aside the decree exceeded its
jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068; and cases hereinafter
cited.) [5] Under the authorities herein cited the probate
court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion and to grant
or deny the application in the exercise of its discretionary
power. (Prob. Code, § 1233; Code Civ. Proc., § 473.)
[6] " ... that orders granting relief [under § 473] have
rarely been reversed and then only for an abuse of discretion.
. . . In addition it is well settled that certiorari will not
lie where the only excess of jurisdiction alleged relates to
insufficiency of the evidence. (Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215,
218 [181 P.2d 1] .) " (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d
159, 162 [222 P.2d 874].) [7] Also, "It need hardly be
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added that on certiorari we do not review matters within the
discretion of the lower court." (Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d
215, 226 [181 P.2d 874].)
[8] The court had no power to and did not base its order
of vacation on section 473, argues petitioner, because the
inadvertence, excusable neglect, etc., were not set forth as
grounds in the notice of motion, as required by section 1010
of the Code of Civil Procedure, no affidavits on that subject
accompanied it and they were not invoked at the hearing. We
have heretofore pointed out that the notice indicated that
relief should be given on those gro1mds, and this should be
sufficient, when we consider that this review is of jurisdictional
error and only such defects may be considered. [9] It is stated
in the affidavit of counsel for Carew and English, filed here
in opposition to the petition for the writ, that at the hearing
on the motion petitioner was advised that the motion was made
under section 473. 'rhat is not denied by petitioner. And at
the hearing, discussions transpired which were not recorded.
They may have shown that the motion was based on section 473.
As far as appears, petitioner made no objection to the hearing
of the motion on the grounds of mistake, excusable neglect,
etc. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction. [10] Moreover, the grounds
under section 473 having been raised at the hearing, and no
objection having been made by petitioner to the sufficiency
of the notice of motion in that respect, the petitioner waived
any such objection. (Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d 144 [173
P.2d 657] ; Mann v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 92 Cal.App.2d
439 [207 P.2d 105] ; Hecq v. Conner, 203 Cal. 504 [265 P.
180]; Simonini v. Jay Dee Leather Products Co., 85 Cal.App.
2d 265 [193 P.2d 53].)
Petitioner relies upon Nason v. Sttperior Court, 39 Cal.App.
448 [179 P. 454], and Westphal v. Westphal, 61 Cal.App.2d
544 [143 P.2d 405], for the proposition that the notice of
motion limited the jurisdiction of the trial court to grounds
other than section 473. In the Nason case the motion was
made two years after the decree of distribution was entered
and section 473 could not be applied. In the Westphal case
the grounds urged on appeal were not urged in the trial
court. Here, accepting petitioner's claim that the notice of
motion was insufficient, the grounds were raised without
objection in the trial court at the hearing on the motion.
[11] Insofar as the lack of affidavits is concerned, assuming they must accompany a motion under section 473,
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the failure to file them with the notice of motion is not a
jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review. (Impe1·ial Beverage Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150
P.2d 881).)
The order vacating the decree is affirmed.
Gibson, C..J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 3,
1952.

[L. A. No. 22103.

In Bank.

Mar. 18, 1952.)

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation),
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION, LEO V. NOWAK et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-A lien for
unemployment disability payments made to an applicant for
workmen's compensation must be allowed against a lump sum
payable under a compromise agreement between him and the
compensation insurance carrier, since such compromise payment comes within the definitions of "compensation'' as enunciated in Lab. Code, §§ 3207, 5001.
[2] !d.-Liens on Award.-In determining ~hether lien for unemployment disability payments should be made against amount
awarded applicant for workmen's compensation as result of a
compromise, theW orkmen's Compensation Law and Unemployment Insurance Act should not be construed together in a
manner which would defeat the legislative intent to avoid
overlapping or duplicating payments, and which also would
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act where there is a question whether benefits are payable under the compensation law.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying claim of lien against amount payable
as compensation under a compromise. Order annulled.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 197.

